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Abstract 
Mandatory pension systems can have a negative impact on 
individual savings and labor supply decisions. In particular, defined 
benefit pension schemes that are not actuarially fair, can create 
incentives for early retirement, and therefore, reduce labor supply 
and the stock of human capital. After a review of frequently 
applied approaches to assess the incentives generated by a pension 
system, the paper develops an indicator to predict the age-specific 
retirement probabilities induced by a particular pension system given 
heterogeneous individual preferences. The paper then describes 
how this indicator could be used to project the size of the labor force 
by gender, age and skill level, and correspondingly, the dynamics 
of human capital accumulation. Finally, the paper develops a set of 
life-cycle income measures to assess how the pension system affects 
decisions regarding the supply of labor in the public and private 
sectors. The methods are illustrated in the case of Morocco. 
Keywords: life cycle models, labor supply, human capital, retirement 
policies, job and occupational mobility
JEL: D91, J22, J24, J26, J62
Streszczenie
Obowiązkowe systemy emerytalne mogą mieć negatywny wpływ na 
indywidualne decyzje dotyczące oszczędności oraz podaży siły robo-
czej. W szczególności systemy emerytalne o zdefiniowanym świad-
czeniu, które nie są aktuarialnie sprawiedliwe, mogą stwarzać zachę-
ty do wcześniejszego przechodzenia na emeryturę, ograniczając tym 
samym podaż siły roboczej oraz zasoby kapitału ludzkiego. W niniej-
szym artykule, po dokonaniu przeglądu często stosowanych sposo-
bów oceny zachęt tworzonych przez systemy emerytalne, opracowali-
śmy wskaźnik, który służy do określenia prawdopodobieństwa przej-
ścia na emeryturę (według wieku), wymuszonego konkretnym sys-
temem emerytalnym, po uwzględnieniu indywidualnych preferencji 
o niejednorodnym charakterze. W dalszej części artykułu pokazujemy, 
jak można wykorzystać ten wskaźnik do prognozowania wielkości si-
ły roboczej, według płci, wieku i poziomu umiejętności, a także dy-
namiki akumulacji kapitału ludzkiego. W końcowej części artykułu 
omawiamy zbiór mierników dochodu w cyklu życiowym służących 
do oceny sposobu, w jaki system emerytalny wpływa na decyzje doty-
czące podaży siły roboczej w sektorze państwowym i prywatnym. Do 
zilustrowania tych metod użyliśmy przykładu Maroka.
Słowa kluczowe: modele cyklu życia, podaż pracy, kapitał ludz-
ki, programy emerytalne, zasady przechodzenia na emeryturę, mo-
bilność siły roboczej
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1. Introduction
Defined benefit (DB) pension systems, usually 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, often embed bad 
microeconomic design features that create distortions 
in savings and labor demand/supply decisions. This 
paper focuses on two that are relevant from the point 
of view of labor markets: (i) incentives to retire early; 
and (ii) institutional fragmentation that can affect the 
mobility of the labor force. None of these features is 
inherently built into a DB system, but the fact is that 
an overwhelming majority worldwide offer incentives 
to retire early and are split into separate subsystems for 
different professional groups (typically civil servants, 
military and private sector workers). The contribution of 
this paper is to develop analytical tools that can be used 
to assess the magnitude of these distortions, particularly 
in the presence of limited data, and to conduct ex-ante 
assessments of the impacts of alternative reforms. The 
methods and results presented here are still preliminary 
and should be seen as part of a broader research agenda 
to improve the assessment of the labor market impacts 
of reforms in the social insurance system.
Most of the research on the impact of incentives on 
early retirement has concentrated on OECD countries, 
which have experienced steady drops in retirement ages 
despite substantial increases in longevity throughout the 
20th century. Most recently, the international research 
project conducted in twelve OECD countries using 
the same methodology (Gruber, Wise 1999; 2004; and 
forthcoming) has found that the great majority of social 
security systems in these countries provide incentives 
to leave the labor force at early ages and that there is 
a strong relationship between these incentives and the 
withdrawal of older workers from the labor force. In 
addition, Herbertsson and Orszag (2003) have estimated 
that early retirement provisions in the OECD countries 
cost on average 7.5% of potential annual OECD output. 
They also showed that the distortions created by early 
retirement can be further accentuated by the ageing of 
the population. For example, they estimated that male 
labor force participation in OECD countries would have 
to rise from 66% to 70% (from 2003 to 2010) to keep 
the costs of early retirement at the 2003 level in 2010. 
More generally, it has been suggested that eliminating 
incentives for early retirement is an important policy 
intervention to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of a 
shrinking labor force as the population ages (see Oliveira 
et al. 2005). The evidence from OECD countries also 
shows that cutting down on early retirement incentives 
through the reform of social security systems can 
have an important effect on labor force participation 
and positive fiscal implications from two sources: (1) 
reduced demand for fiscal support as the financial 
situation of the program improves; and (2) increased 
government tax revenues. The expected savings are very 
large (20 to 40% of current program costs) and countries 
could generate as much as 1% of GDP in government 
revenues resulting from higher labor force participation 
among older workers.1
The institutional fragmentation of the pension system 
is another source of labor market distortions. Fragmentation 
is explained by the emergence of occupational pension 
schemes that preceded the development of mandatory 
government pension schemes. Indeed, in some countries 
the pension schemes for certain occupations (e.g. public 
servants) offer a significant portion of the total employee 
compensation package. This fragmentation of the pension 
system is a significant source of economic inefficiency 
in several cases. Beyond the loss of economies of scale in 
administration we see the lack of (or limited) portability 
of pension rights across pension schemes which induces 
labor market friction. Indeed, the lack of portability 
of pension rights makes the price of separation from 
potentially inefficient matches too high for the separation 
to happen. The labor market is the “place” where the 
dynamic matching process of physical capital and 
labor happens. Any administrative rule that prevents 
the occurrence of productive matches, or that does not 
allow the separation of matches that can be dominated 
in efficiency by another labor-capital match, ultimately 
causes economic inefficiency and does not allow the full 
utilization of the gains from trade.2
The other problem with institutional fragmentation 
is the emergence of different implicit rates of returns 
on contributions across the various pension schemes. 
These distort the role of wages as the system informing 
about the price/value of labor effort. High indirect 
compensation through high internal rates of return (IRR) 
in the public sector for instance, can create incentives 
for unemployed individuals to queue for government 
jobs. Distorted IRRs also create incentives towards 
biased investment in human capital towards the skills 
demanded in the public sector. If certain skills queue 
for jobs in the public sector, shortages can be observed 
in the private sector – which compromises investment 
and growth.
The paper proposes three classes of instruments to 
analyze supply side distortion in labor markets emerging 
from the mandatory pension system. First, we develop 
an indicator to measure incentives for early retirement, 
which takes into account the trade-off between 
consumption and leisure even when the distribution of 
individual preferences is not known. We show that this 
indicator is superior to standard proxies used to analyze 
incentives for early retirement, such as the slope of the 
curve of internal rates of return on contributions and 
the marginal change in pension wealth. Second, we 
1  For more on the labor supply consequences of generous early retirement 
provisions, see Blondal, Scarpetta (1998), and Borsch-Supan, Schnabel (1998).
2  For an extensive review of the ‘segmented labor markets (SLM)’ literature, 
please see Taubman, Wachter (1986). Furthermore, for a take on segmented labor 
markets in the case of Switzerland, see Sousa-Poza (2003).
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show how this indicator could be linked to a model that 
projects the skills composition of the labor force by age 
and gender, to assess the effects that pension policy has on 
retirement decisions, the accumulation of human capital 
and through this channel economic growth. Finally, we 
develop a methodology to assess how fragmented pension 
systems affect incentives to move across sectors and 
decisions about investments in education. To illustrate the 
use of these tools, we take the case of Morocco. Indeed, 
we consider Morocco a good representative of middle-
income countries with badly designed and fragmented 
defined-benefit pay-as-you-go pension schemes. Hence, 
our conclusions can be applicable for other middle-income 
and, to some extent, high-income countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next 
section (Section 2) develops an indicator to measure 
incentives for early retirement. The methodology to 
assess the economic costs of early retirement is presented 
and illustrated in Section 3. Section 4 is concerned with 
the analysis of distortions related to investments in 
education and the mobility of the labor force. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes.
2. Measuring distortions in retirement decisions
The standard indicators used to assess incentives for 
early retirement are the internal rate of return (IRR) 
on contributions and the change in pension wealth at 
a given retirement age.3 These indicators, however, 
have three major problems. First, they do not capture 
the trade-offs between consumption and leisure, which 
are at the core of the retirement decision. Second, 
they ignore the interplay between benefit formulas, 
eligibility conditions and individual attitudes towards 
risk. Third, they would suggest the same retirement 
behavior to people with identical or similar career path 
whereas we observe heterogeneous retirement ages even 
for individuals who are similar or identical in their 
observable characteristic from the perspective of the 
pension system. The implication is that any conclusion 
in terms of whether individuals have weak or strong 
incentives to delay retirement can be misleading. In 
this section, we propose a complementary indicator that 
takes into account the trade-off between consumption 
and leisure as well as the level of risk aversion of 
individuals. The indicator is based on the standard 
inter-temporal utility maximization framework.
In this framework, individuals choose how much to 
save, how much to work, and when to retire in order to 
3  The internal rate of return on contributions is the rate that equates the present 
value of contributions with the present value of pensions. It can be interpreted 
as the implicit interest rate that the pension system pays to plans’ members on 
their contributions. The pension wealth, on the other hand, is the present value 
of expected future pensions. For a discussion on the use of the IRR and the 
incremental change in pension wealth in assessing the incentive structures of 
pension systems, see Queisser, Whitehouse (2006).
maximize some “utility” function of consumption and 
leisure. Formally, we have:
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(1)
where U(.) is a standard utility function capturing the 
trade-off between consumption (c) and leisure (l), vt  is 
the probability of survival to age t, ρ is the rate of time 
preference, y is income, w labor productivity, h total 
available working time at time t, s the savings rate, R 
the retirement age, X is the maximum number of years 
an individual can live and a is the entry age to the labor 
market. The function P(.) gives the value of retirement 
income, which depends on past savings, wages, interest 
rates, as well as policy parameters θ (i.e. the type of 
pension system). We acknowledge the very strong 
implicit assumption that individuals who retire can only 
receive pension income – as opposed to working in the 
informal sector (or formal sector without contributing). 
This simplification is necessary in this version of the 
paper that focuses mainly on general methods. It can and 
should be relaxed in real world policy applications.
Ideally, one would like to solve a system such 
as (1) for every member in a given pension plan and 
estimate econometrically the key unknown parameters: 
the preference for leisure and the coefficient of risk 
aversion. This could be done in principle by using 
individual records for retired individuals. The optimal 
retirement age by individual and therefore the implied 
density of retirement ages do not accept a close form 
solution, but simulators of the density can be used 
to estimate the model parameters by say maximum 
likelihood or expected non-linear least squares (see 
Gourieroux, Monfort 1996). One could then assess how 
changes in policy parameters would affect retirement 
patterns and the associated economic costs – given 
the expected evolution of wages for different plan 
members and other macroeconomic and demographic 
variables.4 Often, however, the necessary data are not 
available. The exercise is also computationally time 
4  An alternative more classical approach would be to estimate reduced form 
models of retirement ages as a function of individual characteristics, pension 
system parameters, and maybe macro indicators at the regional level. A first 
problem with this approach, however, is that the variation in policy parameters 
usually does not exist. Second, even if it existed, benefit formulas and eligibility 
conditions are very complex. One could bundle some rules in binary vectors, 
but then one would not be able to assess how changes in rules would affect 
retirement behavior. Finally, and more importantly, depending on the structure 
of the model, it is likely that the estimated parameters reflect actually individual 
decisions given the structure of the pension system. If the rules change, then the 
parameters would need to change. Thus, the need for a structural model. 
 Makroekonomia  Bank i  kredyt  luty 2008
demanding. Hence, in this version of the paper we focus 
on a simplified version of model (1) that assumes deep 
uncertainty in the distributions of preferences regarding 
consumption, leisure and risks.5
The simplified version that we analyze here only 
focuses on the retirement decision, taking the savings 
rate and labor supply as given. It fixes the savings 
rate equal to the contribution rate (during retirement 
consumption is equal to the pension) and sets the 
maximum labor supply equal to 260/365 (260 is the 
total number of working days in a year). So a retired 
individual would have leisure equal to 1 while a 
working individual would have leisure equal to (365–
260)/365. It further assumes a period utility function 
of the form:
(2)
where a captures trade-off between consumption and 
leisure and l is the coefficient of risk aversion. The 
concept of utility seems abstract but in practice it is 
simply a way to introduce a non-linear link between 
changes in the levels of consumption and leisure 
and the value/happiness derived from them. The 
“curvature” of the utility function with respect to the 
combined consumption-leisure argument is affected 
by the coefficient of risk aversion. The higher this 
coefficient, the higher the curvature. The essence of risk 
aversion is that risk averse individuals value a level of 
consumption c1 that is achieved with 100% probability, 
more than a level of consumption c2 that is realized 
with a probability p ∈ [0,1] even if c1 =c2 ⋅ p+0 ⋅ (1–p) [i.e. 
even if the expected value of consumption is identical 
in both cases].
Given the utility function, a given assumption 
for the path of wages, and the parameters of the 
pension system, it is possible to calculate the optimal 
retirement age as a function of the parameters a and 
l.6 The optimal retirement age would be the age where 
the marginal benefit of delaying retirement by one 
year falls below the marginal costs – all measured in 
utility terms. The benefits are, presumably, a higher 
pension, a higher consumption path, and consequently 
a higher consumption component in the expected 
utility calculation. The cost is delaying the increase in 
the level of leisure and reducing net income given the 
contribution rate.
5  A forthcoming paper discusses in detail methods for more complex real world 
applications where savings and labor supply are endogenous. 
6  The implicit assumption here is that the distribution of individual retirement 
ages can be generated using a sample of “imaginary” individuals who are 
heterogeneous in their preference parameters but identical otherwise (even in 
terms of wage and employment histories). This is an extreme case but that still 
can provide useful insights on the effects of the pension system on retirement 
decisions. The assumption is relaxed in a forthcoming paper. 
Formally, the net gain at age R of delaying retirement 
by one year is as follows:
(3)
where wi is the wage received by the individual at age i 
and t is the contribution rate. So, individuals will delay 
retirement as long as ngu(R)>0.7
Clearly, one does not know the joint distributions 
of the parameters a and l  within the population of 
plan members. Assuming that the individuals are 
identical in all other dimensions, the joint distribution 
of the parameters could be sampled to replicate 
the observed distribution of retirement age.8 Hence, 
one can explore a large number of cases assuming 
that the parameters are uniformly distributed within 
their supports. The probability of keeping a case is 
then equal to the probability of observing a given 
retirement age in the empirical sample. Moreover, 
through the sampling process, it is possible to derive a 
map of functions ngu(R; a, l) that, we argue, provides 
a unique characterization of the pension system and 
informs about the magnitude of possible incentive 
problems. In addition, one can compute a summary 
indicator that gives the percentage of cases where the 
optimal retirement age is below a given threshold. In 
fact, as this indicator can be calculated at all possible 
retirement ages, the entire age profile of retirement 
can be generated for a given pension system. This 
in fact is very relevant to inform changes in the 
distribution of retirement probabilities that result 
from changes in parameters within pension systems 
actuarial models.
We next apply these indicators to the three 
mandatory pension schemes in Morocco. The CNSS 
(Conseil National de S´ecurite´ Social) is the scheme for 
private sector workers. The CMR (Caisse Marocaine de 
Retraites) is the acronym for the civil servant pension 
scheme. Other public sector workers enroll in the RCAR 
(Régime Collectif d’Assurance et de Retraites).9 We 
compare our indicators to the standard measures, the 
IRR and the pension wealth.
In the case of three pension funds, the IRR and 
the pension wealth indicate the existence of incentives 
problems. The IRR is downward slopping for the CNSS 
and the CMR, suggesting that individuals “receive less” 
on their contributions if they delay retirement (see 
Figure 1). For example, an individual retiring at age 55 from 
7  The decision rule that relies on the sign change of ngu(.) assumes that ngu() is 
monotonically decreasing.
8  This is an extreme case but that still can provide useful insights on the effects 
of the pension system on retirement decisions. The assumption is relaxed in a 
forthcoming paper. 
9  The key parameters of the three systems are summarized in the Appendix.
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the CNSS would receive an implicit real rate of return 
on contributions of 5% per year, while an individual 
retiring at age 60 would receive only 4%. This occurs 
because the accrual rate is not adjusted as a function 
of the retirement age to correctly take into account that 
individuals retiring earlier, and therefore contributing 
for a shorter period of time and receiving pensions for 
longer periods, should also receive lower pensions. 
Contrary to the CNSS and the CMR, the RCAR does 
adjust the accrual rate as a function of the retirement 
age, to the point that individuals retiring late receive 
higher IRRs. Hence, one would like to conclude that in 
the case of the RCAR, there are positive incentives to 
delay retirement. How strong are they?
A different picture of the situation is given by the 
change in the net pension wealth occurring as a result 
of a delay in the retirement decision. Similarly to the 
gain in utility defined in equation (3), the change in net 
pension wealth resulting from delaying retirement from 
age j to age j+1 is given by:
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(4)
where PWi  is the value of the pension wealth retiring at age i.
According to this measure, in the case of Morocco, 
none of the pension funds provides true incentives 
for delayed retirement. Changes in pension wealth are 
negative for all retirement ages (see Figure 2). Even for 
the RCAR, the results suggest that current adjustments 
to the accrual rate would not be sufficient to motivate 
individuals to delay retirement. The CMR is a peculiar 
case. The system provides strong incentives to individuals 
who are 59 years old to delay retirement by one year. This 
is because at age 60 the accrual rate increases to 2.5% 
from 2% for all previous years of service.
In practice, however, we do observe that in all 
pension funds individuals retire at various retirement 
ages. The question is really in which pension fund the 
probability of retiring early is higher. It is here where 
the maps ngu(R, α, λ) for each of the pension funds 
become helpful. These maps were calculated under the 
assumption that wages grow in real terms at 3% per year 
and the rate of time preference ρ is 0.98 annually. One 
hundred combinations of the parameters a and l were 
used with a∈[0.2, 0.7] and λ∈[0.5, 5]. The results are 
presented in Figure 3.
The map for each fund is very different and characterizes 
the benefit formulas and eligibility conditions in a unique 
way. Each “line” within the map is associated with a given 
combination of the parameters a and l. In all funds, the 
lines can be grouped into three categories. First, lines which 
are always below the horizontal axis. These are associated 
with utility functions that never generate incentives to 
delay retirement. The gain in expected utility from delaying 
retirement is always negative and individuals retire as soon as 
possible – in our example at age 55. The second type involves 
lines that are always above the horizontal axis indicating that 
the gains from delaying retirement are always positive. These 
lines correspond to individuals who never have incentives to 
retire in the period of analysis (they could retire afterwards). 
Finally, there are lines which cross the horizontal axis. The 
more relevant are the ones that cross the axis from above. In 
this case, the point of crossing gives the optimal retirement 
age.10
In the case of the CNSS, the majority of lines 
are either above or below the horizontal axis. So in 
the CNSS, individuals with a certain propensity for 
retirement will most likely retire as soon as possible. In 
the CMR, the majority of lines start below the horizontal 
axis, cross the line from below and then cross the axis 
again from above. Hence, for individuals it is optimal 
10  The discussion here is simplified so not all the special cases of the 
nonmonotone ngu(.) lines with multiple intersections with the horizontal axis 
are not discussed here; however, the behavioral consequences can be easily 
determined using the same framework for these individuals as well.
Figure 1 .  Internal rates of return on 
contributions
Note: The IRRs are for men with a salary equal to average earnings, who join the 
system at age 25 and contribute continuously until retirement. Real wages are as-
sumed to grow at 3%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 2 .  Changes in net pension wealth 
by retirement age
Note: Same assumptions as for Figure 1. In addition, the discount rate used for 
present value calculations is set at 2%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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to retire as soon as possible up to age 58. At age 59 it 
is better to wait one more year. As discussed below, the 
“distorted” map that emerges reflects the peculiarity 
of the benefit formula based on final wages where the 
accrual rate increases from 2% to 2.5% at age 60. The 
map of the RCAR corresponds to a system that is more 
actuarially fair. A majority of individuals will not retire 
immediately regardless of their propensity to do so. This 
is because of the upward slopping IRR function.
The information captured in the maps can be 
summarized by the probability of early retirement, 
defined here as the probability of retiring at age 55. 
In effect, the normative probability of early retirement 
at a given age is the share of lines staying below the 
horizontal axis for all ages plus the ones crossing the 
horizontal axis from above at a lower age than the given 
fixed retirement age. As suggested by the charts, the 
probability of early retirement is highest in the CNSS. 
Indeed, for 40% of the cases the optimal retirement age 
is 55. For the CMR, the probability of early retirement 
is somewhat lower (36%). As previously indicated, the 
lowest probability of early retirement corresponds to the 
RCAR (17%). So even if the pension wealth indicator 
suggested a lack of incentives for delayed retirement, 
in reality, most probably, the RCAR does encourage 
retirement at higher ages – which is also consistent with 
the slope of the IRR function.
In conclusion, the utility maps and the normative 
estimator of the probability of early retirement provide 
more precise information about the incentives to retire 
early, given individuals with heterogeneous preferences. 
The slope of the IRR function and the change in pension 
wealth are useful to flag distortions, but one needs 
to be careful when deriving conclusions on actual 
retirement behavior based on these measures. Another 
attractive feature of the proposed indicator is that the 
calculations are simple. Therefore, future assessments 
of pension institutions and international comparisons of 
the effects of benefit formulas and eligibility conditions 
on retirement decisions could benefit from the proposed 
calculations. Finally, the indicator is useful to assess, 
ex-ante, the potential impact that policy changes can 
have on retirement decisions. As discussed in the next 
section, these decisions can affect the level of human 
capital of a given country and therefore its growth 
potential.
3. Estimating the cost of early retirement in 
terms of the loss of productive capacities of the 
economy
As discussed in the previous section, from the individual’s 
point of view the decision to retire is a choice that reflects 
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Figure  .  Utility maps for the retirement decision
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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preferences between leisure and consumption. From 
the point of view of the country, however, retirement 
represents a loss of human capital, particularly when 
it occurs at early ages. Standard analyses in pension 
policy focus on the fiscal costs of early retirement (the 
loss of contributions and the increase in the pension 
wealth that individuals receive). Here we argue that the 
economic cost of early retirement should be also taken 
into account. In this section, we propose a methodology 
to assess the impact that a pension system can have on 
human capital accumulation and economic growth by 
influencing retirement decisions11 and therefore labor 
force participation rates for individuals with different 
skill levels.12
3.1. The model – from skill formation to human capital
The model developed here projects the labor force 
by gender, age and education level.13 Assuming a 
competitive environment, we characterize the human 
capital of individuals with the marginal product of 
their labor. This marginal product is approximated by 
standard wage functions that we describe in the next 
section.14
The fist step is to project the total population by 
age and gender on the basis of expectations about future 
fertility and mortality rates. Hence a vector Pop(g, a, t) is 
computed where g=1 if male and g=2 if female, a refers 
to age and t refers to the time period.
11  The model could be used as well to assess the economic impact of the effect 
of the pension system on the age of entrance to the formal labor market. 
12  In this paper, the term human capital is used for the human capital actually 
offered for work, i.e. the human capital stock does not include the potentially 
highly productive, but inactive population. For various concepts of human 
capital, see Becker (1993).
13  The methodology developed here builds upon Cörvers et al. (2002), and 
Heijke (1994). 
14  The empirical analysis of the household survey presented in the following 
section includes the economic sector in the set of explanatory variables 
determining wages. Since the labor force projection model does not have a 
sector dimension, the specification of the wage equation omits economic sector 
from the set of right-hand side variables.
The next step is to project the supply of skills by 
the education sector. This supply is characterized by the 
vector Skill(σ, g, a, e, t) where σ=1 refers to “enrolled in 
an institution of the education system”, σ=2 refers to 
those who are “not enrolled in the system of education”, 
while e ∈ {no education, 1st year of primary education, 
2nd year of primary education, …} is an element of the 
complete set of educational attainment categories.
We start by modeling enrollment in primary 
education. We have:
(5)
where SR(g, a=6, t) is the scholarization rate at the 
mandatory primary education entry age. (P1 refers to 
“1st year of primary education”, NoEd refers to “no 
education”). Those who do not enter primary education 
are registered as “out of school” population without 
education.
Based on the time series on education enrollment 
stocks, advancement rates, repetition rates and drop-out 
rates, an Ex(E+1) skills development transition matrix 
(TR) is generated, where E is the number of distinct 
educational attainment categories. TR(e1, e2) is the 
probability of “advancing” from education category e1 
to education category e2. In the special case when e1=e2, 
TR(e1, e2) refers to repetition probability.15 TR(e1, E+1) 
is defined as the probability of successfully completing 
educational level e1 and leaving the education system 
after the successful completion. So how does the model 
follow educational attainment in society? A particular 
education level “e” can be reached because individuals 
advance in their education or repeat. In the general case, 
we therefore have:
(6)
where Mort(g, a, t) is the gender and time specific 
mortality probability of dying between ages a–1 and a. 
Clearly, for many cases TR(i, e)=0, meaning that here 
is no transition path between i and e. Also, note that 
the model is only concerned about net flows. Beyond 
the age of entering primary education, the net flows 
are always within and from (never from outside) the 
education system.
Those who finish successfully their intended level 
of education are transitioned out the school system 
according to the following equation:
15  Note that this formulation assumes that the transition probabilities only 
depend on the “to” and “from” education categories, and independent of gender, 
age and time. The reason why we do not present a more general formulation 
is that we assumed an only 2 dimensional transition array in the quantitative 
example we present in this paper. 
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
RCAR
CMR
CNSS
Normative probability of retirement at age 55
Figure  .  Normative probability of early 
retirement
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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(7)
The probability of dropping out of school is the 
difference between 1 and the sum of the elements in a 
given row of the transition matrix. We have:
(8)
Finally, the evolution of those who already left 
the education system is according to the following 
equation:
(9)
The third step is to model the participation in the 
labor force among those individuals who are out of the 
education system. Given information on the size of 
the labor force and labor force participation rates, the 
following identity needs to hold:
(10)
where LF is the labor force array and LFPR is the labor 
force participation array. From (10) we then estimate 
ELFPR(g, a, e, t), or the effective labor force participation 
rates that only apply to individuals out of the school 
system.16
Finally, we are ready to turn the LF array into a 
measure of human capital. Recall that we can predict 
the individual human capital value for all combinations 
of gender, age and educational attainment categories 
HCCat(g, a, e). Then, the evolution of human capital is 
given by
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(11)
By adding σ=3, as the “retirement” category, this 
simple setting can be used to directly assess the effects 
that changes in retirement probabilities have on the labor 
force by gender, age, and type of skills and therefore in 
the level of human capital. Hence, one can compare 
the dynamics of human capital under the status-quo 
with the dynamics of human capital in the case where 
participation rates change as a result of changes in 
pension benefit formulas and eligibility conditions.
Admittedly, there are limitations with the 
proposed analytical framework. First, the choice of the 
measure of human capital only considers the supply 
16  In practice, we had to make certain homogeneity assumption in the case of 
the labor force participation rate array since the level of the desegregation of 
the available data along the educational attainment dimension was insufficient. 
Indeed, the only data available in the case of Morocco comes from the ILO, 
which only publishes age and gender specific labor force participation rate (see 
LABORSTA database).
side of the labor market, i.e. implicitly assumes that 
those who enter the labor force will actually get a job 
and thus become a part of the (productive) human 
capital stock. Hence, our projections really constitute 
an analysis of potential human capital. In addition, 
the individual productivity values that we derive are 
associated with the interaction of labor supply and 
demand at a given point in time, and then we assume 
that this interaction is applicable to the future. Note 
that the productivity of a given unit of human capital 
can change as a result of technological progress. 
Our estimates of human capital should therefore be 
considered as a lower bound.
3.2.  Quantitative example: The case of Morocco
We illustrate the use of the model in the case of Morocco. 
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of population growth 
and the skills composition of the labor force as projected 
in the baseline scenario for Morocco. The question that 
we ask is how changes in participation rates – induced 
by changes in retirement probabilities – would affect 
these baseline dynamics.
The right-hand panel of Figure 6 illustrates that 
male labor force participation rates are high across 
the board including ages potentially affected by early 
retirement (that is prior to age 60, which is the 
“standard” retirement age). This is in part due to the 
low coverage of the pension system in Morocco. The 
male labor force participation rate for the 59 year-old 
age cohort is 84.3%! There seems to be little room for 
further increasing male activity rates, but these could 
fall as the coverage of the pension system expands. In 
fact, the range of labor force participation rates of 51–
59 year-old men is expected to move from 84.3%-95.7% 
to 74.7%-94.3% by 2040. In contrast, female labor force 
participation rates are low across the board and steeply 
decreasing from ages 51 to 59 from 28.7% to 16.1%. 
While female activity is expected to increase, the 
steeply decreasing activity prior to age 60 is expected 
to persist (e.g. in 2040, 48.8% of 51 year-old women are 
expected to be employed or seeking employment, while 
only 35.3% of the 59 year-old women is expected to 
belong to the labor force).17
We assess 5 possible scenarios for changing 
early retirement behavior and associated labor force 
participation. The first scenario assumes that female 
labor participation patterns change immediately and 
the new labor force participation rates of women aged 
51 to 60 are identical to that of the 50 year-old cohort. 
The second scenario is the same for women, but we also 
17  We do not address labor force participation patterns beyond age 60 for two 
reasons: 1) early retirement rules are not applicable to this age group and only 
delayed retirement bonuses could affect the activity of these generations; 2) the 
dispersions of the state of individual health conditions are so large beyond 60 
that retirement incentives cannot be effectively assessed without considering 
this constraint.
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fix the male labor force participation rates at 2005 levels 
– we do not allow male participation rates to fall like in 
the baseline scenario. The third scenario assumes the 
same time invariant male activity rates at the 2005 level, 
but in this case female activity patterns do not change. 
Scenarios 4 and 5 increase the labor force participation 
rates of women aged 51 to 60 by 25% immediately 
without imposing a time invariant male labor force 
participation rates, respectively.
Figure 7 summarizes the results. Recall that the 
major determinants of the evolution of human capital, 
i.e. population growth, skills development through 
education and the baseline labor force participation path 
determine a baseline increasing path for human capital. 
In the case of Morocco, the annual rate of human capital 
growth stands at 3.56% in 2006 and this rate is expected 
to decrease to 1.1% by 2040. In most cases, the human 
capital growth rate would be higher than the baseline 
if corrected early retirement incentives convince a 
significantly higher ratio of those who are close to the 
standard retirement age to remain in the labor force.
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Figure  .  Population growth and skills composition of the labor force in Morocco
Source: ILO, authors’ calculation.
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Figure  .  Age/gender specific labor force participation rates in 2005 and 2040
Notes: For female participation rates are assumed to deviate from the baseline due to changes in early retirement provisions (see main text).
Gender and age group specific activity rate projections are available from the ILO until 2020, beyond that linear convergence assumed to the activity rates of 
the ILO aggregate category “more developed regions” reaching its level in 2075.
Source: ILO Laborsta Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections and authors’ calculations.
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4. Pension system fragmentation and labor 
mobility
This section illustrates the effects that a fragmented 
pension system can have on incentives to supply labor 
in a given sector as well the mobility of the labor across 
sectors. The analysis is based on micro simulations 
of career paths for individuals with different levels of 
education working in different economic sectors – and 
therefore belonging to different pension plans.
Formally, at time t, the wage of an individual of 
gender s, age i, education category e, working in sector j, 
expressed as a share of average earnings is given by:
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where s, i, e are respectively the gender, age, and level 
of education of the individual and j is the economic 
sector where he or she operates.18 Hence, the marginal 
effect that age (experience) has on wages depends on 
the characteristics of the individual and the economic 
sector.
Given equation (12), for any given individual we 
can compute net income flows across life. These are 
given by:
(13)
where R=1 if the individual is retired or R=0 otherwise, 
P (.) is the function returning the pension of the 
individual as a function of policy parameters of the 
18  Note that the variable ‘s’ refers to savings rate in earlier section, to gender in 
the application of this section.
relevant pension system in the sector, and E(e, i) is a 
function that is equal to 1 if an individual that will 
achieve education level e is out of school at age i or 0 
otherwise. Also, for simplicity we set the initial age and 
the initial time at 1 so t and i are substitutes.
Using (13) we can compute internal rates of return 
to marginal investments in education. The internal rate 
of return r*(s, i, e, j) of moving from education level e to 
education level e+1 is characterized by:
(14)
Finally, we can compute the expected net gain of 
taking a job in sector j at time t, or waiting to take a 
job in sector j ’ at time t+1 with probability p(j). This is 
given by:
(15)
where PV[] is the present value function. The last term 
in equation (15) is used to take into account that an 
individual who continually delays taking the job in 
sector j might have to accumulate some level of debt to 
finance its consumption. The parameter a gives the age 
when the individual is first offered the job in sector j. 
Here the assumption is that the individual borrows a 
fraction b of the net income flow that he or she would 
have achieved by taking the job in sector j.
We again apply this framework to the case of 
Morocco. Equation (12) was estimated by using the 
2002 household survey for Morocco. We defined 10 
levels of education for the purposes of the analysis. In 
addition, we consider four economic sectors: private, 
formal non-agricultural sector, the public sector, and 
the agricultural/informal sectors. In the analysis, we 
constructed 120 career paths. These paths cross 10 
levels of education, with four economic sectors, and 
with three types of pension funds. As before, in all cases, 
the growth rate of real average earnings is set at 3% per 
year and the discount rate is 4%.
The results show marked differences in the 
dynamics of wages across education levels. The left-
hand panel of Figure 8 shows the career path of three 
individuals who work in the private sector. One has no 
education, the other has only secondary education and 
the third one has higher education. Not surprisingly, for 
the individual with no education the wage curve starts 
at a lower level and is also flatter. The various career 
paths also show that individuals working in the public 
sector, regardless of the level of education, enjoy a better 
situation both in terms of wages and pensions (see right-
hand panel in Figure 8). On the contrary, individuals 
working in the agricultural sector and/or the urban 
informal sector receive lower wages than in the private 
sector – and they do not have pensions.
time invariant male LFPRs
female LFPRs increase by 25% for ages 51–60
& time invariant male LFPRs
female LFPRs remain at age 50 level for ages 51–60
& time invariant male LFPRs
female LFPRs remain at age 50 level for ages 51–60
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Figure  .  Changes in the growth rate of 
human capital due to changes in labor 
force participation rates
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ILO labor force participation projections.
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There are also important variations across sectors 
in terms of the internal rates of return on investments 
on different levels of education. Higher education, for 
instance, is better valued in the public sector (Figure 
9). Secondary education with a technical diploma from 
a vocational training institution is highly valued in 
the private sector. In the informal sector, on the other 
hand, the highest rates of return are for investments 
in 9 years of basic education plus a technical diploma 
from a vocational training institution. In all sectors, 
investments in only primary education or primary 
education plus a technical diploma are not worth 
much. These investments are important, only as that 
they allow individuals to access higher educational 
levels.
What are the incentives for individuals to queue 
for jobs in the civil service? To answer this question, 
we compute equation (15) for a 25 year-old individual 
having to decide whether to take a job in the private 
sector at time t, or wait for a job in the public sector that 
can occur with probability p. We simulate four values 
for p: 1%, 5%, 10% and 20%. We also assume that if the 
individual does not work he/she has to borrow an amount 
equivalent to 50% of the salary paid by the private sector 
job. The net gains from waiting for the public sector job 
are graphed in the left-hand panel of Figure 10. Each 
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line corresponds to one value of p. We observe that even 
in the case of a very low probability of finding a public 
sector job, the individual has an incentive to wait for one 
year. If the probability of finding a job is 10% then the 
individual would have incentives to wait for 8 years. If 
the probability is 20% then the individual would have 
incentives to wait for 12 years. With no borrowing needs 
(b=0) even with a 2% probability of finding a job in the 
public sector, the individual would have incentives to 
wait for 10 years (see dotted line).
How much of the incentive to delay taking the job 
in the private sector is explained by the pension system? 
To answer this question we calculate equation (15) 
assuming that pensions in the civil service respond to 
the same rules as pensions in the private sector. We then 
compare the resulting ngw (.) functions. The percentage 
differences between the net gains of waiting at different 
ages are graphed in the right panel of Figure 10. The 
results show that differences in the pension system 
have strong effects around the age where waiting is no 
longer optimal. Depending on the probability of finding 
a job in the public sector, differences in pensions can 
increase by 10 to 40% of the net gain of waiting and 
therefore provide strong incentives to let the job in the 
private sector pass. Similarly, pensions can reduce by 
10% to 30% the loss from waiting and also contribute 
to queuing.
The final question that we address is: what are 
the incentives to switch from a public sector to a 
private sector job? We do this analysis for an individual 
with higher education considering the possibility of 
switching at various ages. The relevant measure in 
this case is the change in the financial wealth, which 
is the present value of future wages and pensions. The 
results are presented in Figure 11. Not surprisingly, our 
calculations show that individuals switching would face 
important losses; the financial wealth could be reduced 
by 46% to 48%.
Most of the losses in financial wealth are of course 
attributable to lower salaries in the private sector. A 
sizable part of the losses, however, is also explained 
by the move to a less generous pension system. Hence, 
the change in pension system reduces the financial 
wealth by between 5% and 15%, depending on the 
age of the switching. The longer the individual waits, 
and therefore the higher the expected pensions are, the 
higher the loss (see orange line in Figure 11).
This section has analyzed incentives for labor 
mobility across main economic sectors. The analysis 
is based on the simulation of career paths and the 
calculation of three indicators: internal rates of return 
on education, net gains from queuing for jobs in the 
public sector, and the change in wealth resulting from 
switching jobs across sectors. These indicators can be 
easily computed on the basis of labor force or household 
survey data. When applied to Morocco, the indicators 
show that its fragmented pension system, more generous 
for civil servants, distorts rates of return on education, 
reduces incentives to supply labor in the private sector, 
and discourages mobility between the public and private 
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sectors. The corollary is that pension reforms that unify 
the pension system can contribute to facilitate labor 
mobility across sectors and therefore contribute to 
improved economic efficiency.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we discuss and attempt to measure two 
of the distortions that badly designed defined benefit 
pension system (lacking actuarial connection between 
contributions and benefits) can impose on labor markets: 
incentives for early retirement, and incentives to queue 
for jobs in the public sector.
In the case of early retirement we argue that the 
standard indicators used to assess incentive problems, 
the internal rate of return (IRR) on contributions and 
the pension wealth are not appropriate. This is mainly 
because the indicators do not capture the trade-offs 
between consumption and leisure, which are at the 
core of the retirement decision. Thus, we proposed a 
complementary indicator – the normative estimator of 
the probability of early retirement based on utility maps. 
This indicator takes into account the trade-off between 
consumption and leisure as well as the heterogeneity of 
preferences of individuals.
We applied the indicator to the case of Morocco, 
a fairly representative country for the middle-income 
group. We showed that incentives for early retirement 
are important, particularly in the national scheme. 
We also illustrated how the indicators can be used in 
the context of a model that projects the labor force by 
age, gender, and skills level, to assess how changes in 
benefit formulas and eligibility conditions affect the 
accumulation of human capital. In the case of Morocco, 
on average, in the period 2006–2040, corrected early 
retirement incentives could increase the human capital 
growth rate by approximately 2% under conceivable 
stylized scenarios. We find this impact quite significant 
in light of current pension reform discussion/decision-
making practices that fail to quantify the effects of 
pension reform on labor markets.
Subsequently, we analyzed incentives to supply 
labor in the private and public sector. The analysis 
was based on micro simulations of career paths for 
individuals with different levels of education working in 
different economic sectors – and therefore belonging to 
different pension plans. We focused on three indicators: 
internal rates of return on education, net gains from 
queuing for jobs in the public sector, and the change 
in wealth resulting from switching jobs across sectors. 
When applied to Morocco, the indicators showed that 
a fragmented pension system distorts rates of return 
on education, reduces incentives to supply labor in the 
private sector, and discourages mobility between the 
public and private sectors. The corollary is that pension 
reforms that unify the pension system can contribute 
to facilitate labor mobility across sectors and therefore 
improve economic efficiency.
There are both methodological and policy 
conclusions from our paper. Regarding the methodology, 
we believe that future assessments of pension institutions 
and international comparisons of the effects of benefit 
formulas and eligibility conditions on retirement 
decisions could benefit from the calculation of the 
normative estimator of the probability of early retirement 
based on the utility maps. The indicator is useful to 
assess, ex-ante, the potential impact that policy changes 
can have on retirement decisions. In addition, we believe 
that a complex analysis of the consequences of early 
retirement should go beyond the narrow assessment of 
the impact on the financial sustainability of the pension 
scheme and its fiscal implications. It should address the 
impacts on labor force participation rates, human capital 
accumulation and ultimately economic growth. The 
methodology described in this paper using the gender, 
age and educational attainment specific projection of the 
labor force and the associated measure of human capital 
seems a suitable framework for this type of analysis.
Regarding policies, the paper strengthens the 
argument for the existence of significant economic 
benefits of reforms that reduce incentives for early 
retirement, and eliminate differences in benefit 
formulas and eligibility conditions for different 
segments of the labor force. While those benefits 
have been pointed out in the literature, there are 
still a significant number of policy-makers in 
high- and middle-income countries that consider 
them exaggerated, especially when compared to 
the political costs of introducing pension reforms. 
Our paper will hopefully contribute to some re-
assessment of the cost-benefit analysis of pension 
reforms, by showing that the benefits may have been 
so far underestimated.
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Table A.1 .  Characteristics of the CMR and the CNSS in Morocco
Characteristic
CMR
CNSS
civil servants military 
Eligibility conditions    
Age 60 years for men and women 45 or 50, depending on grade 60 years for women and men
Vesting period None No 15 years
Rules for early retirement
15 for women; 21 for men; the 
accrual rate is reduced by 0.5 
percentage point
Same as for civil servants
55 years for women and men; no 
penalties apply, but the employer 
pays the pension between ages 
55 and 60
Rules for delayed retirement – – –
Rules for abandoning the system
Employee receives his or her 
contributions (not employer’s) 
without interest
Same as for civil servants
Individuals can only receive 
benefits if they meet eligibility 
conditions
Social security contribution rates
14% of gross wage (employer, 
7%; worker, 7%); for old-age 
pension, 14%; for other benefits, 
noncontributory. Contribution 
increases to 20 percent at a rate 
of two percentage points per 
year. Other benefits are financed 
directly by the government.
21% of gross wage (employer, 
14%; worker, 7%) to finance 
old-age pension. Other benefits 
are financed directly by the 
government. 
20.39%(employer, 16.09%; 
worker, 4.29%). Old-age, 
disability, and survivor pensions, 
11.89%; family allowance, 7.5%; 
short terms benefits , 1%
Accrual rate 2.5% 2.5% 
3.3% first 15 years; 1 percent 
afterward (law indicates 50% t 
of the income measure for the 
first 3,240 days, then 1 percent 
for each block of 216 days; 
simplification assumes that one 
year is 216 days of work)
Income measure Last salary Last salary Last 8 years (no revalorization applies)
Ceiling on covered wage No No DH 6,000
Maximum replacement rate or 
maximum pension
Maximum pension is 100% of 
net wage
Maximum pension is 100% of 
net wage 70% of gross wage
Pension indexation Ad hoc Ad hoc Ad hoc
Minimum pension DH 500 a month DH 500 a month DH 500 a month 
Economy-wide minimum wage DH 2,009 a month
Economy-wide average wage DH 2,750 a month
Source: CMR and CNSS.
– Not available or not offered
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Table A.2 .  Characteristics of the RCAR in Morocco
Characteristic RCAR (basic regime)
Eligibility conditions
Age 60 years for women and men 
Vesting period 21 years
Rules for early retirement
55 years for both women and men with 21 years of contributions. 
The pension is reduced by 4.8% for each year missing to reach the 
normal retirement age (60).
Rules for delayed retirement If individual retires after age 60 the pension increases by 4.8% for each year above the age of 60. 
Rules for abandoning the system Receives capital accumulated in the individual accounts
Social security contribution rates
18% of gross wage (employer, 12%; worker, 6%). Of these, individual 
accounts, 12%; family allowances, 0.65%; disability and survivor 
pensions, 1%; general fund covering future unfunded obligations of 
the scheme, 4.35%
Accrual rate 2 percent
Income measure All remunerations (revalorized by the growth rate of the average covered wage) 
Ceiling on covered wage Four times the average salary (DH 11,000 in 2003)
Maximum replacement rate or maximum pension 90%
Pension indexation Automatic indexation to consumer price index
Minimum pension No
Economy-wide minimum wage –
Economy-wide average wage DH 2,750 a month 
Source: RCAR.
– not available or not offered
